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The complexity of the ocean ecosystem, including the human component, is such
that a single fishery may require multiple policy instruments to support recovery and
conservation of protected species, in addition to those for fisheries management. As
regulations multiply, the need for retrospective analysis and evaluation grows in order
to inform future policy. To accurately evaluate policy instruments, clear objectives and
their link to outcomes are necessary, as well as identifying criteria to evaluate outcomes.
The Northeast United States sink gillnet groundfish fishery provides a case study of the
complexity of regulations and policy instruments implemented under the Marine Mammal
Protection Act (MMPA) and the Endangered Species Act (ESA) to address bycatch of
marine mammals. The case study illustrates a range of possible objectives for the policy
instruments including biological, economic, social-normative, and longevity factors. We
highlight links between possible objectives, outcomes and criteria for the four factors, as
well as areas for consideration when undertaking ex-post analyses. To support learning
from past actions, we call for a coordinated effort involving multiple disciplines and
jurisdictions to undertake retrospective analyses and evaluations of key groups of policy
instruments used for protected species.
Keywords: policy instruments, marine mammals, bycatch, social norms, compliance, retrospective analysis,
ex-post analysis
The complexity of the ocean ecosystem, including the human component, is such that a single
fishery may require multiple policy instruments to support recovery and conservation of protected
species. Many policy instruments are assessed prior to implementation (i.e., prospective or ex-ante
analysis) when we have limited information; however, we seldom go back to undertake evaluation
after implementation (i.e., retrospective or ex-post) when we have more information (Greenstone,
2009). As regulations multiply, the need for ex-post analysis grows, as it allows us to identify what
works and what does not. After 20 years of regulating under the Marine Mammal Protection Act
(MMPA) and the Endangered Species Act (ESA) in the United States (US), regional Protected
Resources (PR) leaders for National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) have
voiced their desire to learn how well the policy instruments in place are working, as well as how
accurate our estimates of impacts made prior to implementation (ex-ante) are compared to actual
economic and biological outcomes (ex-post) (Bisack et al., 2015). In order to undertake such
instrument evaluation, evaluation criteria based on measurable outcomes must be identified (Rossi
et al., 2004), which in turn are defined by the objectives of the instrument.
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Traditionally the performance of protected species
management has been measured using biological criteria as
proxies for the larger policy objectives and outcomes. For
example, under the MMPA the biological objective is to conserve
marine mammals as significant functional elements of marine
ecosystems, which is primarily undertaken with moratoriums
on their direct take. The 1994 potential biological removal
(PBR) control rule under the MMPA sets the criteria for how
much bycatch is allowed. Yet policy instruments for protected
species recovery generally have multiple objectives, suggesting
the need for multiple criteria or measures of performance
outcomes. Proposed regulations for policy instruments must
meet economic and social objectives; evaluation criteria are
necessary for these objectives as well. For example, a regulation
must ensure that national benefits exceed costs [i.e., under
Executive Order (EO) 12866 in the US or the Cabinet Directive
on Regulatory Management (CDRM) in Canada] and consider
distributional impacts [e.g., among small businesses, minority
groups and/or low-income populations under EO 12898, the
Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA) and CDRM]. A regulation may
also be required to illustrate that future compliance, monitoring,
and enforcement costs have been considered (e.g., under the
CDRM), although even when this occurs motivation and
incentives to comply are seldom addressed.
We advocate for a coordinated effort involving multiple
disciplines and jurisdictions to develop an evaluation strategy for
protected species policy instruments. Further, we advocate for the
use of multiple evaluation criteria based on biological, economic,
social-normative, and longevity objectives and outcomes, to name
a few. The biological and economic efficiency objectives may
be more recognizable, and potentially easier to attain, than
the distributional concerns of participants in a fishery, which
may be captured in social-normative objectives. Instruments
that explicitly consider social-normative factors may be better
situated to address the distributional issues (e.g., access/exclusion
from fishing opportunities), issues which can delay or impede
implementation. Since the design and implementation of policy
instruments is costly, it may be desirable to include design
features that extend the useful life of an instrument by allowing
it to adapt to a changing environment (i.e., longevity). With
this group of factors in mind, we use the Northeast United
States (NE US) sink gillnet groundfish fishery as a case study
to illustrate considerations when identifying evaluation criteria.
While we recognize that the success of a policy instrument in
achieving its objectives may be, in part, unique to the setting, we
believe that assessing the strengths and weaknesses of a range of
policy instruments is essential to developing successful plans for
protection of species in the future.
The NE US sink gillnet groundfish fishery has been regulated
under multiple legislative authorities for over 20 years. The
MMPA provides the authority to address bycatch of marine
mammals such as harbor porpoise in commercial fisheries, while
the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management
Act (MSFCMA) provides the authority to manage commercially
fished species in US waters. During the early 1990’s, high harbor
porpoise mortalities motivated innovative cooperation between
industry, scientists and government which resulted in the
development of acoustical devices (pingers) that attach to gillnets
to deter porpoise interactions (Kraus et al., 1997). The first
Take Reduction Plan (TRP) under the MMPA combined pinger
requirements and gillnet gear closures to protect harbor porpoise
(National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), 1998), with monthly
rolling closures under the Northeast Multispecies Fishery
Management Plan (FMP) (63 Federal Register 66464, December
2, 1998). By 2000, harbor porpoise mortalities/takes were below
the PBR level (Waring et al., 2002). However, the reduction in
takes under the plan was temporary (Waring et al., 2006), even
though restrictions on effort in the commercial groundfish fishery
were ongoing to achieve stock rebuilding goals.
By 2004, Days-At-Sea (DAS), initially established in 1994 to
limit the number of days a vessel owner could fish, had dropped
between 67 and 100% for any given vessel and catch trip limits
had tightened (New England Fisheries Management Council
(NEFMC), 2006). In addition, a sector allocation program
(similar to a harvest cooperative) was introduced, which allocated
a share of a groundfish stock to a group of vessel owners
that voluntarily joined a sector group. Only one sector formed,
the Cape Cod Hook Sector, which was allocated a share of
Georges Bank cod. In response to overfishing of several stocks,
including Gulf ofMaine cod, a 2006 emergency rule implemented
differential DAS counting (National Marine Fisheries Service
(NMFS), 2006), and NMFS approved a second voluntary sector
which was a gillnet gear sector (71 Federal Register 48903,
August 22, 2006). In 2010, a revised voluntary sector allocation
program was implemented for the entire groundfish fishery.
Vessels that did not join a sector fished under the effort controls
(DAS) and an Annual Catch Limit (ACL) for all the vessels
in the “common pool” (75 Federal Register 18356, April 9,
2010). About 55% of the northeast gillnet vessels joined one of
seventeen initial sectors. At about the same time pinger non-
compliance was identified as a major source of high bycatch
of harbor porpoise, and a revised TRP was implemented. The
TRP increased, spatially and temporally, the areas that required
pingers to fish, and created an incentive for pinger compliance
in the form of a threat—indefinite closures over a large area
if compliance remained below defined levels (National Marine
Fisheries Service (NMFS), 2009). Industry agreed to the plan that
would largely rest on individual responsibility for compliance
(i.e., self-policing).
The choice of a policy instrument may influence the objectives
that can be considered during design, and consequently during
evaluation. As illustrated with the harbor porpoise example, most
policy instruments NOAAhas implemented formarine protected
species under its authorities have used a “command and control”
(C&C) approach directed toward fishermen (also see National
Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), 1998; National Oceanic
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), 2006, 2009, 2012). Policy
instruments under the C&C approach include controls on
inputs (fishing effort, DAS) and outputs (catch, ACLs), as
well as technical standards (gear modifications, pingers). Under
the C&C approach, the governing agency requires individuals
to undertake specific activities to meet specific standards to
achieve a specific objective; this approach can limit the ability
of individuals to achieve economically efficient outcomes.
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In general, the more specific is the requirement, the fewer
opportunities exist for individuals to modify their behavior
or processes for economic efficiency. The specificity of C&C
instruments may encourage the use of sunset clauses, to address
concerns of cost and effectiveness. The objectives of a C&C policy
instrument for protected species tends to be narrowly focused
on a biological outcome, with economic considerations focused
on a least-cost or cost-effective objective. While other factors
may be considered during policy development, they are seldom
explicit.
Economists have long supported policy instruments where
market signals create incentives for desired behavioral changes;
this may require consideration of additional objectives such
as social-normative objectives. Incentives can be classified
as positive (“carrots”), such as property rights, or negative
(“sticks”), such as taxes, fines or sanctions. In the harbor
porpoise case study, the threat of an indefinite closure if pinger
compliance did not meet a target was a “stick.” Generally positive
rewards are preferred to negative punishments, given political
and user difficulties with imposing and enforcing sanctions
(Polasky and Segerson, 2009). Market-based instruments allow
individuals to voluntarily choose how to meet an objective,
with prices and other economic variables providing signals
to reduce or eliminate negative externalities (e.g., harbor
porpoise bycatch). This flexibility may allow the instrument
to adapt to changes in economic or biological environments.
Market-based instruments, explicitly or implicitly, establish some
degree of property right characteristics (exclusivity, divisibility,
transferability, duration, and enforcement), that allow for
better planning by users, owners and managers. There is a
growing literature on the implications of various market-based
instruments in fisheries management (e.g., Pascoe et al., 2010;
Squires et al., 2013; Innes et al., 2015). Yet, even with these
approaches, some forms of technical standards or controls are
typically retained to support or complement market measures,
further supporting the need for evaluation of C&C instruments.
Theoretical and empirical analyses of policy instruments
for protected species have largely focused on biological and
economic outcomes. However, objectives based on social norms
(e.g., fairness) may also be implicit in an instrument, and
an understanding of those norms is important to successful
implementation of either C&C or market-based instruments.
Social norms include the unwritten, yet mutually understood
rules that govern acceptable behaviors and coordinate
interactions with others within a society. Human societies
use norms of acceptable behavior among their members with
the threat of punishment encouraging compliance. There is
generally a range within which acceptable behaviors fall, but
also a consensus as to when behavior falls within and outside
the range of “acceptable skirting” of the rules (e.g., Toner et al.,
2014). Misperceptions in group norms, as well as perceptions
of a lack of adherence to norms such as fairness, can result
in the creation of a new social norm that may run counter
to the intensions of the policy instrument; non-compliance
may be a potential outcome. Investing in stakeholder meetings
during development of a new policy instrument is an approach
to understand customary rules of behavior and factors of
importance, as well as provide a baseline of existing norms.
At times, minor changes in regulations can eliminate small
incentives for non-compliance, nudging the average fisherman
toward compliance. While details on methods to identify norms
go beyond the scope of this paper, non-compliance may be a
signal that the norms implicitly assumed by the designers of the
policy instrument do not align well with those of the community
the instrument impacts.
Few evaluations of protected species policy instruments have
been undertaken. A coordinated approach to analysis may create
synergies, although such an approach will require agreement
on a number of factors such as identification of baselines and
evaluation criteria. A few considerations for such an approach
are examined below; in particular, we suggest four general criteria
as the initial focus. Table 1 uses examples from the case study to
illustrate potential means to identify and measure the proposed
criteria. For retrospective analyses and evaluations to be useful
the objectives of a policy instrument must be clearly linked to
its outcomes or results. As well there needs to be a way to
determine if the change in outcome was due to the instrument
or other forces. This is done using a baseline which describes
what would have happened if the policy instrument had not
been implemented. Simulation is frequently used to develop
a baseline for retrospective biological and economic analyses.
Alternatively, experimental or quasi-experimental design may
be used to identify the outcomes of similar situations where
the policy instrument was not implemented; these may be
called counterfactuals (Greenstone, 2009). Experimental-based
counterfactuals for protected species may be difficult to identify
due to their imperiled state or legislated requirements; however,
alternative locations or jurisdictions and species may provide
relevant examples.
The biological objective of most actions directed toward
protected species is conservation; however, the criteria to evaluate
biological objectives may vary depending on the population
status and condition of the species such as endangered,
threatened (ESA, Species at Risk Act of 2002) or depleted
(MMPA). That is, criteria to measure the success in meeting
the biological objective may relate to bycatch (incidental take),
abundance, distribution, or the probability of extinction of a
species. Often determining the biological objective does not
automatically translate into measurable criteria to evaluate the
outcome. Fisheries observer data have provided fertile ground
for ex-ante analysis, prior to implementation of the instrument.
There are enough direct interactions observed for species
such as harbor porpoise (Table 1), loggerhead sea turtles and
bottlenose dolphins for ex-ante analyses to attain predictive
statistical power (National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS),
2009), suggesting sufficient data may also exist for ex-post
analyses. In contrast, species with limited observed interactions
such as the North Atlantic Right Whales (NARW) require
non-standard approaches. There are no direct interactions
recorded by observers of NARW bycatch in the gillnet fishery;
rather, mortality, along with a cause determination, is typically
determined post-mortem after carcass recovery. Thus, for a
species such as the NARW, performing ex-ante analysis on the
implications for a regulation to achieve a conservation objective
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may be challenging. The data however, may be sufficient for
the development of ex-post evaluation criteria. For example, to
assess the effectiveness of regulations, Pace et al. (2014) developed
a novel method that relied on opportunistic entanglement
data from 1999 through 2009. The study determined gear
modifications as outlined in the Large Whale TRP did not
result in a detectable decrease in waiting time (the number
of days) between entanglement events. Thus, they concluded
management measures implemented during the study period
to reduce large whale mortalities were generally ineffective in
abating whale deaths from fishing gear entanglements; hence,
more action was required. It is worth noting, human behavior
was not included in this model. Perhaps a multi-disciplinary
approach would have identified the source of the failure and
potential solutions.
The economic objectives used to inform the selection of a
policy instrument for protected species, unlike the biological
objectives, are seldom articulated during the development
phase of the instrument. However, most developed nations
require some sort of ex-ante cost-benefit analysis to support
regulatory proposals, although allowance for cost-effective
analysis may exist in some guidance documents (e.g., Treasury
Board of Canada Secretariat (TBS), 2007). For example, in
the US, Executive Order 12866 requires an evaluation of
costs and benefits of regulatory proposals to US society and
a determination of net benefits to the Nation (net national
benefits). In Canada, the CDRM requires an evaluation of social
and economic impacts, and directs authors of a regulation
to identify the “instrument that maximizes net benefits for
[Canadian] society.” Most economic analyses for protected
species are ex-ante analyses, and economic measures of benefits
are often not available. In such cases, net benefits analysis may
be replaced with cost-effectiveness analysis, such as the cost of
saving a porpoise estimated in the 2010 TRT plan (Table 1;
National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), 2009). Instruments,
however, may not always require regulation; instrument actions
may be voluntary or negotiated between parties (Segerson,
2010). In such cases ex-ante analysis may not be undertaken
and retrospective analysis may be more challenging. Examples
of ex-post economic analyses are relatively rare and focus on
regulatory change. While not specific to protected species, Lee
and Thunberg (2013) showed the benefit of moving to catch
shares by evaluating the additional cost if the US Northeast
groundfish fishery had instead remained under DAS. In that
scenario, the US society would have been $33 million worse off
($25 million in consumer surplus and $7.5 million in producer
surplus). Squires showed a $75 million loss in US consumer
surplus as a result of increased sea turtle bycatch in foreign waters
following driftnet fishery area closures to protect sea turtles in the
US (Bisack et al., 2015).
Explicit incorporation of social-normative objectives in policy
instrument development is rare, and yet these factors may have a
significant impact on the implementation and outcomes of policy
instruments (Revesz and Stavins, 2007). Both norms surrounding
compliance and level of participation in the creation of
regulations are important determinants of eventual compliance
behavior (e.g., Dalton, 2005a,b; Pomeroy and Douvere, 2008).
Not considering these factors can reduce compliance and result
in unmet goals and objectives. Social pressure (community),
perceived legitimacy, fairness, and morals (stewardship) are all
examples of normative factors. The case study of the gillnet fleet
and high non-compliance with pinger regulations illustrates the
importance of social-normative factors (Table 1).
The fundamental premises of consequential closures in
the 2007 TRP were: (1) as a result of the threat, non-
compliance with pinger requirements would decrease and ensure
bycatch rates would not exceed benchmark limits; and, (2)
the threat of indefinite seasonal closures would encourage
fishermen to enforce compliance with pinger requirements
among their communities (i.e., self-police). However, successful
“self-policing” requires a small group or community that
conducts activities in a confined setting with members that
have face-to-face contact (Dietz et al., 2003). Northeast sink
gillnet vessels reside in ∼22 different ports on the long New
England coastline from Maine to Connecticut, making face-
to-face contact problematic. During focus groups, sink gillnet
fishermen who are members of groundfish sector groups self-
report that they have a high level of compliance with pinger
requirements (Bisack and Clay, 2012). Sectors are typically
limited to a small number of members and for gillnet, the
negotiated contract identifies pinger violations as one cause
for expulsion. Focus group participants provided insights into
pinger non-compliance including: they knew who the “violators”
were in their (local) communities, saw punishment as non-
existent (lack of fairness), and, while they believed pingers deter
porpoise (legitimacy of the solution), they also believed the
stock was healthy and therefore management was unnecessary
(legitimacy of problem). Work such as this may provide a
framework for future stakeholder meetings to gather information
on social norms when developing new policy instruments.
This information may improve understanding of potential
outcomes and assist with retrospective analyses, as well as
support the development of methods and systems to gather
baseline information on norms or identifying counterfactuals for
retrospective analysis.
Lastly, one objective of instrument design seldom discussed
is longevity, which considers whether the instrument is able to
continue to achieve the intended outcomes over time, given
changes in human behavior and environmental conditions. That
is, given the biological, economic, and social-normative factors
associated with the instrument, how long should we expect
that instrument to continue to meet the purpose and need
for the policy? The RFA requires a periodic review of some
regulations to consider this question, while one of the benefits
of market-based policy instruments is their ability to allow
participants to respond to changing conditions. Diametrically
opposed to longevity are sunset clauses, which are often added
simply as a means to get disparate groups to agree to a policy.
While such clauses may purport to be concerned with outcomes
and effectiveness, their actual timing may occur before results
are anticipated and may not include measures to evaluate
effectiveness, an issue for data-poor and long-lived species such
as NARW (78 FR 73726, December 9, 2013). Synergistic and
cumulative impacts with other management actions are likely
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to have an impact on the longevity of a policy instrument, and
need to be considered as well. For instance, under the MMPA
closures may coincide with changes in effort on commercial
stocks targeted by sink gillnet vessels. Achieving the MMPA
biological PBR criteria is feasible when there is no change in
the fish management actions that suppress effort. However, if
fishing effort increases as fish allocations increase, the objectives
of the closure may be defeated as takes of PR increase in
the open areas. Instrument effectiveness may also decline due
to biological factors. For example, concerns have been raised
regarding the potential for harbor porpoise to habituate to
pingers. While one field experiment found porpoises in the Bay
of Fundy habituated to a specific pinger and were not alerted
to echolocate by pingers (Cox et al., 2001), alternative analysis
using interaction data from the NEFOP concluded there did not
appear to be habituation (Palka et al., 2008). In general, concerns
about changes in biological or environmental conditions are
addressed by reactively adding additional instruments onto
existing measures. While sunset clauses and retirement plans
should be considered during design, possible evaluation criteria
include measures of the frequency of modifications or additions
to the instrument (Table 1).
The need for retrospective analysis of individual policy
instruments and evaluation across instruments and settings,
for marine protected species is clear, but the way forward is
less so. The management of marine fisheries with protected
species interactions is set within a complex system. Ecosystem
based management (EBM) can provide a natural bridge
between single species assessments and management. However,
current EBM models are frequently missing the economic
and social components, which would consider interactions
between ecological and human systems. Retrospective analysis
and evaluation can guide us. We need to identify a common
language for a multi-disciplinary approach and select a small
number of data rich examples for an initial analysis and
evaluation. We encourage looking beyond national borders for
potential counterfactuals, increasing data collection on non-
biological factors for baseline development and suggest further
consideration for quasi-experimental design opportunities. The
information gleaned from retrospective analysis and evaluations
can help identify the key factors to consider when choosing
an instrument (e.g., biological, economic, social-normative, and
longevity). The goal is more effective use of policy instruments
from all perspectives.
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